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2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2012 to 00-00-2012 4 3) The bulk of this liability is $10.0B for the 1703 sites identified in the Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) program and $4.4B for the 2433 sites identified on Active Installations. The remaining $0.8B is in Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). The estimated completion dates for many sites, particularly in the FUDS program, are decades out if they are to be cleaned up at planned funding levels using current practice.
When a munitions response site is cleaned up, in most cases, it is mapped with a geophysical sensor and the locations of all detectable signals are excavated. Geophysical sensors detect metal and, therefore, many of the detections do not correspond to munitions, but rather to harmless metallic objects. Field experience indicates that 95-99% or more of objects are found to be nonhazardous. Current technology does not provide a means to discriminate between munitions and other items, termed "clutter." As a result, most of the costs to remediate a munitions-contaminated site using current methods are spent on excavating targets that pose no threat.
Classification is a process used to make a decision about the likely origin of a signal. In the case of munitions response, high-quality geophysical data can be interpreted with physics-based models to estimate parameters that are related to the physical attributes of the object that resulted in the signal, such as its physical size and aspect ratio. The values of these parameters may then be used to determine whether the signal arose from a munition or harmless clutter. With reliable classification, only the munitions need to be removed from the site. The physics governing the electromagnetic response of a metal object is well understood and predictable. Data collected with these sensors contain the same information content on any site and demonstrations to date have confirmed that classification works predictably. Nevertheless, demonstrations will be required at a number of sites to represent the wide variability in munitions types, target densities, terrain, vegetation, geology, land use history, future land use, and other site characteristics that will affect the applicability of classification and to establish cost effectiveness and implementability. The demonstrations also present an opportunity to work out standard operating procedures and establish quality control (QC) measures. Prior demonstrations have been done at the former Camp Sibert, AL, the former Camp San Luis Obispo, CA, and the former Camp Butner, NC. Details about past and ongoing demonstrations can be found on the SERDP-ESTCP web site at http://serdp-estcp.org/Featured-Initiatives/Munitions-Response-Initiatives/ClassificationApplied-to-Munitions-Response.
The demonstration at the former Camp Beale is the first test in which production geophysics contractors both collected and analyzed advanced sensor data using the MetalMapper. As such, one purpose of the demonstration was to train production contractors using the MetalMapper for the first time. This is an important consideration in evaluating and applying the results, which varied widely. We discourage potential customers from using the demonstration results to rank performers and make contracting selections. Particularly, poor performance by a contractor in a single demonstration should not be considered disqualifying for performing classification, as analysts will gain experience and improve. Data were also analyzed by experienced teams from the developers of the classification methods. Table 1 shows the participants and their roles in the MetalMapper demonstration. 
Camp Beale Demonstration Flow
The sequence of the demonstration is outlined in the flow chart in Figure Prior to the beginning of data collection, an instrument verification strip (IVS) was installed and the site was seeded with inert munitions and small industry standard objects (ISOs), were dug up to provide complete ground truth for the purposes of determining performance. The UXO technicians photographed each item that was dug and recorded its location, depth, and description.
The geophysical data were passed to the data analysis teams. A complete overview of the analysis procedures can be found in Ref 2. Briefly, the analysts used methods based on the dipole model to estimate target parameters. Analysts were offered training data from test pit measurements and the opportunity to request additional training data from the recovered targets, as though they were doing a limited number of sample digs. These data were used to set classifier rules -the decisions that separate the anomalies into TOI and non-TOI. The classifiers were then applied to all of the targets that remained blind for each demonstrator. Since training data was by request, the blind target set was different for each demonstration.
The product required from each analyst was a ranked anomaly list as shown in Figure 2 -2. One and only one judgment was required for each entry on the anomaly list. The first items on each anomaly list are those targets for which reliable parameters cannot be extracted and therefore must be dug. Next are those items which the analyst is the most confident are TOI. The items are ranked according to decreasing likelihood that the item is a TOI. Any items which the analyst was able to analyze but was not able to make a classification decision on at this time were placed next on the anomaly list. Last are all those items that the analyst was confident are not TOI ranked by their likelihood. This initial list is shown in the left panel of Figure 2 -2. The seeds were divided into QC seeds and blind seeds. When analysts submitted their initial prioritized lists, the QC seeds were used to provide feedback if seed targets were missed. Analysts were also provided with the ground truth information on all anomalies in the red part of their lists and any requested anomalies in the yellow part. This is signified by the threshold on the left side of Figure 2 -2. Based on this information, the analysts were then allowed to revisit their rankings and assignments for all items that were still blind until they were satisfied that the best possible classification had been achieved.
In the final list, shown in the right panel of Figure 2 -2, the analyst was required to provide a threshold that corresponds to the division between those items recommend for digging and those that can safely remain in the ground. That is, the list is all red and green with a threshold separating the two categories. The final prioritized anomaly lists were scored against the emplaced blind seeds and recovered targets by IDA.
Site Description and Preparation
The former Camp Beale is an approximately 60,000-acre site located in Yuba and Nevada Counties, CA. Camp Beale was subject to complex historical usage over many years and there is an overlapping network of historical ranges throughout. The demonstration was conducted in an area that is located within the historical bombing Target All visible metal objects were removed from the surface at the site. First order reference points were installed by a registered surveyor for geolocation reference. A quiet area was located near the Prior to the demonstration, the suspected munitions in this area included:
 37-mm projectiles,  60-mm mortars,  81-mm mortars, and  105-mm projectiles.
At the particular site of this demonstration, evidence of 81-mm mortars and 105-mm projectiles was found during the Site Inspection intrusive investigation in 2005. (Ref.
5) It is also suspected that 60-mm mortars may be present. In addition, 37-mm projectiles have been found scattered throughout the former Camp Beale and are included as another suspected munition in this area. Due to the complex usage of this site over many years and the overlapping network of historical ranges, it is also possible that other munitions types beyond those listed above are present.
The objective of the demonstration was to detect and correctly classify all TOI on the site. The analysts were provided information about the historical use and known munitions types. But, the direction specified that, in addition to these munitions, any unexpected munitions would also be considered TOI. During the intrusive investigation, the only munitions-related items found, other than those expected, were expended fuzes. These were determined to be nonhazardous by virtue of their having functioned and they were not included in the TOI.
At a live site, the number of UXO is small, far from enough to determine any demonstrator's classification performance with acceptable statistical confidence bounds. In fact, on the Camp Beale demonstration site, only four munitions were recovered in the intrusive investigation. Therefore, the site was seeded with enough TOI to ensure statistical validity on measures of classification of TOI. The seeds are listed in No attempt was made to separate the seeds from the surrounding clutter. For safety, seeds were emplaced using standard anomaly avoidance procedures. For realism, the emplacement teams were instructed to replace any metal dug up during emplacement back in the hole with the seeded object. All seed depths were specified at 15 cm in the site seeding plan, with direction for crews to bury them deeper where soil conditions allowed. In some cases, the items were buried at shallower depths due to ground conditions.
EM61 Detection Survey
An initial survey was performed with an EM61-MK2 in its standard cart configuration with cm-level global-positioning-system (GPS) navigation. These data were used both to provide a common anomaly list for the two MetalMapper data collections that were to follow and to attempt classification using only the EM61 data as a point of comparison.
The data quality objectives for the detection survey were based on the 37-mm projectile, which was expected to be the most difficult to detect TOI at the site. The EM61 survey was performed on half-meter line spacing. The anomaly selection criteria were set to detect a 37-mm projectile at a depth of one foot (30 cm). This depth was chosen as the deepest depth to which a 37-mm could be reliably detected. The EM61 signal strength in channel 2 versus depth for the 37-mm is shown in 
MetalMapper and Data Collection
The MetalMapper developed by Geometrics is designed to be a stand-alone survey and cued detection system. The system, shown in Figure 5 -1, is composed of three orthogonal 1-m x 1-m transmitters for target illumination and 7 three-axis receivers for recording the response. Its sampling is electronically programmable and therefore flexible. It measured the decay curve up to 8 ms after the transmitters were turned off. Centimeter-level GPS is used for navigation and geolocation and an inertial measurement unit (IMU) is used to measure platform orientation. In cued mode, MetalMapper is positioned over each anomaly on its target list and collects the full suite of data while stationary. The digital data set produced by MetalMapper is fully described in Ref. 8 . Details on the data collection and QC procedures followed by each vendor can be found in the respective reports. (Ref. 9, 10) The most common QC failure was that the MetalMapper was positioned too far from the anomaly to obtain reliable parameter estimates. For both vendors, if the separation between the center of the MetalMapper and the anomaly location was more than 40 cm, the anomaly was revisited and additional data collected within the 40-cm specification.
The methods used by the two contractors to collect background data differed and likely affected the analysis of some targets. The background is subtracted from the data taken over an anomaly to remove any ground response. Parsons collected background data in the morning and evening in the area of the IVS. CH2M HILL collected background data several times per day at areas throughout the site near where they were collecting cued data. Due to moderate geologic response of the soils and variability in this response across the site, particularly in the central area shown in Figure 5 -2, the more frequent background data collection sampling throughout the site by CH2M HILL resulted in better background subtraction for some targets.
Both data sets were analyzed by multiple analysts. Although there were small differences in various measures of data quality, in addition to the background subtraction issue, both data sets were of high overall quality and acceptable to perform classification. Detailed comparisons of the analyses of the two data sets can be found in the individual analysts' reports available on the SERDP-ESTCP web site (http://serdp-estcp.org/Featured-Initiatives/Munitions-Response-Initiatives/ClassificationApplied-to-Munitions-Response/Former-Camp-Beale). The production rates for the two data collectors were 115 and 186 targets per day for CH2M HILL and Parsons respectively. CH2M HILL reported recollecting data on about 7% of the total anomalies due to QC failures, while Parsons reported an overall rate of 10%, with about 20% at the beginning of the field work falling off to only about 2% near the end. Both contractors noted that these rates reflect inefficiency inherent in learning to operate a new system and are not likely predictive of future productivity.
Classification Results
All data sets were analyzed by multiple analysts, including both the developers of the analysis methods and production geophysics vendors. At their specified thresholds, most analysts achieved good results, correctly classifying 95% or more of the TOI and eliminating 70-85% of the clutter. This includes both the classification algorithm developers and the production contractors and is quite remarkable, especially considering that this was the attempt at analyzing MetalMapper data by many of these analysts. However, there was a range in performance, with one analyst correctly classifying less the 95% of the TOI at his threshold and another achieving only about a 30% reduction in clutter.
This range is even more evident in the right panel. The best performer could have eliminated all but 100 of the clutter (a 93% reduction) with 100% correct classification of TOI, where as the poorest performer at best could have eliminated about only 7% of the clutter. 
Analysis by Algorithm Developers
Here Ideally, a classifier would correctly identify all targets of interest in the red with zero clutter and all of the clutter would be in the green. In this case, the red part of the curve would go straight up to 100% and the green part of the curve would run straight across the top axis. Success in these demonstrations was defined by eliminating the maximum amount of clutter while correctly identifying all of the TOI. In this demonstration, there were 1310 total clutter items as determined from the ground truth. This analyst was able to correctly identify all but 249 of these items, for a possible savings of more than 80% of the digs. However, one ISO seed item (Target 1965 ) is missed at the analyst threshold. This target was examined in detail to determine the cause of the failure.
This analysis relied on matching the measured signature of each target to candidate targets of interest in a library. Figure 6 -3 shows the response of the missed target (its three principle polarizabilities versus time) as calculated from the data collected by Parsons and by CH2M HILL. The measured data are shown in colors and the library signatures are shown in gray. In the Parsons data, the largest response in red follows the library response -although not exactly -for the entire time window, the second response in blue follows the library curve only to about 1 ms and then wanders off, and the third response appears poorly defined throughout and wanders around. The best match of the measured data was to the ISO, but the fit was poor and below the threshold selected by the analyst to declare a match. With closer visual QC, the poor data in the green line would be discounted, which would have prevented the miss.
The responses calculated from the CH2M HILL data are shown for comparison. In this case, both the largest and second responses follow the library curves throughout the time window. Again, the weakest response is poorly defined and wanders. However, the overall match to the library item is much better in this case and the target is correctly identified as an ISO. There is nothing about this ISO that makes it impossible to classify. However, the miss in the analysis of one of the data sets highlights the difficulties in properly classifying low signal targets. The information available from the EM61 is much more limited than that available from the MetalMapper: estimates of object size are poorer and the decay rate is measured at only 4 coarse time intervals over a much shorter time window. This performance is the best result that could be achieved by an experienced analyst using these data. 
Analysis by Production Geophysics Companies
Geophysicists from Parsons and CH2M HILL also analyzed the MetalMapper data sets that each contractor respectively collected. The results of the Parsons analysis are shown in Figure 6 -5. This classification is excellent. The analyst is able to correctly identify all but about 285 of the total 1310 clutter items, for a potential savings of about 75% of clutter digs. Again, the figure reflects that target 1965, an ISO seed, was incorrectly classified as clutter. This is the same seed that was missed in the analysis by SAIC of the same data set. The Parsons analyst indicated similar difficulties. show the right general trend, in that the red part of the curve rises steeply initially and the green part flattens out. But, this analyst placed a large number of anomalies in the yellow "can't classify" category and it is clear he had difficulty with a number of TOI that appear in the green "high confidence clutter" category. We do not believe that this is due to any major differences in the quality of the MetalMapper data collected, as other analysts in the developer community achieved good results with the CH2M HILL data. Rather, we believe that additional training is needed on the analysis side so that all analysts can spot quality problems in the numerous steps that are involved in the classification process. 
Cost Comparison
The demonstration took place on a small part of the former Camp Beale site and incurred costs for many items specific to a demonstration that would not be needed in an application of classification to a real site. Nevertheless, we can extract meaningful projected performance for the technology and apply reasonable industry unit costs for various elements to arrive at a total cost comparison for clearing an example 100-acre site with and without the use of classification.
We made the following assumptions:
 The example takes place in an area with similar munitions types and the same density of anomalies as seen in the demonstration. Excluding the seeds, there were 1338 anomalies in the 6-acre demonstration area. 1 Extrapolating, we would expect about 22300 anomalies in a similar 100-acre area, with 22266 clutter.  Two TOI were found during the intrusive investigation of the 6-acre area, for a rate of 0.33 TOI per acre. In a 10-acre site we predict about 33 native TOI.  The baseline is an EM61 survey with 0.5-m line spacing. This would be used to select anomalies for digging without classification and the same anomalies would be interrogated with MetalMapper and classified.
 The site is seeded at a rate so on average one seed will be encountered each day of MetalMapper data collection. With an estimate of 22,300 total anomalies and a production rate of 200 anomalies per day, we seed a conservative 125 inert items. These QC seeds would be used whether classification was used on the site or not.  The classification performance is as achieved by Parson, as shown in Figure 6 -5, with ~75% of the clutter correctly identified and remaining undug.  The unit costs are as shown in Table 8 With these assumptions the costs were calculated using the elements shown in Table 8 -2. If classification can be done from $35 per anomaly including both data collection and analysis, which is consistent with the projections of the production companies based on this demonstration, a 45% overall savings is possible. If this cost can be lowered to $25 to classify each anomaly, the potential project savings increases to 52%. 
Conclusions
Classification was used on the former Camp Beale to successfully identify all of the TOI and eliminate about 75% of the clutter. Production contractor field crews from two different vendors collected high quality cued MetalMapper data. Both production contractor geophysicists and the developers of classification methods were successful in using these data to achieve substantial classification. Among the production geophysicists, there was considerable variation in performance. Some had difficulty with identifying about 5-10% of the TOI. Additional training is needed so that all analysts are able to identify problems that can be encountered in the multiple analysis steps required in classification.
In two ways the former Camp Beale is a challenging site. First, the TOI included small 37-mm projectiles, as well as seeded small ISO's for the first time. These items are similar in size to the much of the clutter. Second, the geology at the site produced moderate soil responses that affected the data analysis. Anomaly density was moderate, at about 250 per acre, and did not present any particular difficulty.
Attempts at classification using the EM61-MK2 were not successful at this site, likely due to the requirement to classify small objects of a size comparable to much of the clutter. This is consistent with the results of the prior demonstration at the former Camp Butner, where both the presence of small targets and high anomaly density led to poor classification using the EM61 data. 
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